Armed Guards - Are Yours Sharing Weapons?

Since the hijacking of the MT Smyrni in May 2012, no commercial ship has been successfully attacked by pirates and the crew held for ransom in the north-west Indian Ocean. 

The extremely effective combination of naval forces presence in the High Risk Area (HRA), shipping companies applying Best Management Practices (BMP) and the use of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP) – armed guards; has provided an effective deterrent to Somali pirates hijacking ships.

The success of this triad of deterrents resulted in the HRA being significantly reduced in size on 1 December 2015.  Consequently, naval forces have been significantly reduced under political pressure, and the application of BMP has relaxed, but the use of PCASP to protect commercial ships transiting the HRA remains at somewhere between 30-50% of ships transiting the area, depending upon which geographical sector of the area you look at.

Providing an effective and efficient maritime armed guard service is primarily about administration and logistics, having the right people (correctly vetted and qualified guards) in the correct location, at the right time, with the correct equipment (weapons, ammunition and security-related equipment) and appropriate documentation to be able to embark a ship in transit for the contracted period of providing the service.  The challenge, especially for smaller private maritime security companies (PMSCs), is having sufficient weapons, legally owned by that PMSC, at the point of embarkation, with a team, on time; especially if they work on the “spot market”.

The private maritime security industry has consolidated significantly, but remains fluid.  It wrestles with the challenges of a perceived reducing threat, a crowded and immature market with some PMSCs negotiating unsustainably low charges for transits, set against international community and shipping association’s ever increasing demand for high standards of compliance. 

For a PMSC, moving personnel around the HRA is relatively easy utilising commercial airlines.  However, because many coastal States around the rim of the HRA specifically prohibit the landing of weapons and ammunition, it is almost impossible to move them unless they are being used by a PCASP on task.  Consequently, the management of weapons is very challenging and many companies hold up to twice the number of sets of equipment that are used on a regular basis, in order to ensure they can meet the demand.

On the face of it, proof of weapon ownership is quite simple; it comprises three elements; the owner (PMSC), the weapon (each weapon is identified by a serial number which is different and engraved on the weapon in at least two places; the body of the weapon and the working parts).  The third critical element that links the PMSC to the weapon is the end user certificate (EUC).  The EUC for each weapon, (specified by weapon serial number), will name the PMSC as owner.  However, not all EUCs are the same (there is no standard international format), some EUCs list multiple weapons and some countries do not issue them (such as the UK, but this is supplemented the UK’s Open General Trade Control Licence Maritime Anti-Piracy).

There are two “touch points” when the three elements (PMSC, weapon and EUC) can be verified; firstly, during the contract negotiation.  Secondly, when the PCASP and its equipment are embarked onto the ship, normally at sea, mid-voyage.

This complex system is prone to abuse and some PMSCs have overcome the logistical challenges of providing PCASP and equipment by the “renting” and “borrowing” of weapons from other PMSCs, which is mostly illegal. 

In 2012 BIMCO launched GUARDCON, a standard contract for ship owners and charterers to use to contract PCASP, which has proved to be extremely successful and is widely used.  In Section 5 of the Explanatory Notes covering permits and licenses for the contract it states; “The consequences of contractors failing to have the required permits and licences effectively makes the carriage of weapons illegal”.  In November 2016, this point was further emphasised in BIMCO’s revised guidance, additionally noting that the “ship’s flag State needs to see the EUC and verify its authenticity”.  Failure to do this would breach the contract and thereby cause the ship’s insurance to be invalid.

The unauthorised use of weapons is also in contravention of ISO Standard 28007 and the many nations legislation where the PMSCs are registered.

An additional factor which potentially exacerbates the problem is the use of Floating Armouries (FA).  As outlined earlier, many coastal States around the rim of the HRA prohibit the landing of weapons and ammunition.  Consequently, a number of entrepreneurs independently developed the concept of placing relatively small vessels (typically offshore support vessels) in strategic locations, with weapon, ammunition and equipment storage capacity and some accommodation facilities.  The vessels are located in international waters at the corners of the HRA, predominantly in the Gulf of Oman and Red Sea.  At its peak, SAMI estimated there were 17-20 FAs in the HRA, each storing around 1,000 weapons, along with ammunition and security equipment. Whilst the international community has expressed concern about this practice, most flag and coastal States lacked the impetus to create an international regulatory structure for FAs, with most States turning a blind eye to the potential risks of not doing so.  Because of this apathy, FAs lack any form of centralised control, making it impossible to verify where weapons not on task with PCASP are located.  Inevitably some FAs are managed more effectively and efficiently than others, leading to inconsistencies, confusion and an ideal opportunity for the illegal “borrowing” and “renting” of weapons by PMSCs so inclined. 

The FA situation was further complicated in early January 2017 when the commercial decision was taken by Sovereign Global Services (SGS), one of the few accredited FA service providers, to close their FAs by mid-February.  It is estimated that SGS holds between 20-30% of the weapons, ammunition and security equipment in circulation in the HRA (including the entire inventory of some PMSCs).

The stage is set for a worrying situation to suddenly get much worse.  Increasing competition, caused by consolidation in the private maritime security industry, has led to an emerging practice of borrowing and renting of weapons illegally by some PMSCs, which is snowballing.  Illegal use of weapons by PCASP could breach contracts and may affect a vessel’s insurance policies.  Furthermore without weapon ownership verification conducted effectively ships may be detained in ports.

As problems emerge, solutions appear as well which will help the diligent flag State, ship owner and charterer to protect themselves from these risks as weapon verification organisations become established.  It is too early to know exactly how this situation will develop, but the more proactive are always in a stronger position.