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Shanghai MSA - Concentrated Inspection Campaign on Propulsion and Auxiliary Machinery

Dear Sirs/ Madam,

Following a serious collision accident taking place in Deep Water Fairway of Changjiangkou (CJK) off Shanghai in December 2020, Shanghai Maritime Administration ("Shanghai MSA") issued a Safety Notice (Appendix 1) to urge all ships to undertake thorough testing and rectify all the defects/deficiencies so as to make sure that propulsion and auxiliary machinery are in good order prior to departure from the berth or arrival in the restricted waters.

Main Content of the Notice

Shanghai MSA made it clear that a ship which suffers a malfunction of forgoing machinery and poses a hazard to the safety of navigation will be subject to thorough administrative investigation as well as PSC/FSC inspection. It is advised that serious deficiencies will give rise to detention.

Procedures of MSA Inspection

In the meantime, Shanghai MSA launched a 3-month Concentrated Inspection Campaign (CIC) on propulsion and auxiliary machinery, commencing from 15 March 2021 and ending on 15 June 2021. The main objectives of this CIC are to ensure that ships and shipping companies fulfill their non-delegable responsibility for the safety of operation, improve skills of master and crew of the ship for safety and emergency operation the steering gear, propulsion and auxiliary machinery and minimize the loss of lives and property arising from related accidents.

Port/Flag State Control Officers (PSCOs /FSCOs) will carry out detailed inspections to verify critical areas for the steering gear, main propulsion machinery, generator, the emergency source of electrical power and its alarm systems, crew familiarization and operational controls. Unlike CIC launched by Tokyo MOU, PSCOs/FSCOs will not apply a questionnaire listing a number of items to be covered during the CIC, but we have obtained a Report (Appendix 2) issued by MSA which we trust it will be helpful in understanding the scope of the CIC. We are advised that the listed items in the Report are not exhaustive and may be varied to take account of the circumstances of the particular ship or its operations.

Our experience suggests that when an incident in relation to propulsion and auxiliary machinery failure occurs, the ship will be subject to both investigation and PSC/FSC inspection and it is highly likely that detention is inevitable. Normally, the failure of machinery and proper operation alone at the incident time will only give rise to a request to rectify the deficiency before departure (inspection action code “17”) but a combination of deficiencies of a less serious nature may result in the detention of the ship. We note that ISM-related detainable deficiencies (inspection action code “30”) are frequently found where technical or operational deficiencies which individually do not lead to detention but collectively warrant the detention of the ship which indicates a serious failure, or lack of effectiveness, of the implementation of the ISM Code. Under these circumstances, ISM will be reported in the PSC inspection report with the requirement that an additional safety management audit has to be carried out by the flag state or the RO before the ship may be released from its detention.

Further, we understand that a ship may be placed under quarantine for a period of time subject to local quarantine policy before investigation and PSC/FSC inspection takes place. We have come across several cases where vessels had to wait a long time before investigations and PSC/FSC inspections take place as a result of main engine failure and MSA said that a ship has to be quarantined for some time counting from the next day when the vessel left the last foreign port and the latest requirement is 14

days but there is no written document to justify the said requirement.

Suggestion

In light of the above, ships are reminded of following best practice to ensure compliance with the provisions of the relevant regulations from SOLAS Chapter II-1/II-2 to minimize risks of failure of machinery and proper operation before entering restricted waters and undertaking critical manoeuvres. If ships are in any doubt of the delay in investigation and inspection following an incident, we would suggest that MSA's order be complied with in the first instance and then remedies be sought afterwards.

If you have any queries or need assistance, please contact Huatai Shanghai office +86 18016228366 or email to pni.sh@huatai-serv.com.

We are always here to be of assistance to the Clubs and their Members.

Best regards,



Luo Yong
General Manager

Appendix 1:
Safety Notice of Shanghai MSA

Appendix 2:
Shanghai MSA's Concentrated Inspection Campaign (CIC) on Propulsion and Auxiliary Machinery

SAFETY NOTICE

On December 13 2020, the container ship “Oceana” (IMO 9634684) lost control in the deep water channel of CJK area. MV “Oceana” subsequently collided with the domestic cargo ship “XINQISHENG 69” which subsequently sank and left 4 seafarers dead and 4 seafarers missing.

This matter is currently under investigation and the search for all of the remaining seafarers is continuing.

In order to avoid similar failures and prevent accidents occurring, All vessels in the concerned waters are hereby urged to thoroughly test its engines and ensure the main engine, steering gear and all essential maneuvering systems are in good order before departure from the berth, as well as before arrival in the high density traffic waters. Any defects found should be corrected before the vessel departs the wharf or arrives in the high density traffic water.

If any malfunction arising from such defects subsequently occurs and impacts upon the vessel’s safe navigation in any respects, it will be thoroughly investigated. The vessel will be subject to PSC inspection also, and severe cases may lead to detention respectively.

If the departure from the last foreign port is less than the period of quarantine assigned by the local quarantine policy, the investigation and inspection will be carried out after fulfilling the quarantine requirements at the anchorage. All associated cost will be on the ship's account.

Shanghai Maritime Safety Administration of P.R.China

Appendix 2

Shanghai MSA's Concentrated Inspection Campaign (CIC) on Propulsion and Auxiliary Machinery

I. The Scope of the CIC

A. The inspection date

Commencing from 15 March 2021 and ending on 15 June 2021.

B. The targeted ships

FSC: Chinese ships meet targeting standards.

PSC: Foreign ships meet New Inspection Regime (NIR) standards of Tokyo MOU and COVID-19 requirements.

II. Inspection Contents

A. Steering gear

1. The main steering gear;
2. The auxiliary steering gear;
3. The remote steering gear control systems;
4. Emergency power supply;
5. The rudder angle indicator' reading is in compliance with that of the actual position of the rudder;
6. The remote steering gear control system power failure alarm;
7. The remote steering gear power unit failure, phase loss and overload alarm;
8. The full movement of the rudder according to the required capabilities of the steering gear;
9. The operation of the means of communication between the navigation bridge and steering gear compartment (ship more than 40 meter in length);
10. The changeover between main and auxiliary steering gears.

B. Main engine and auxiliary machinery

1. Main engine fuel oil supply systems (including pump, piping systems and separator);
2. Main engine lubricating oil systems including pump, piping systems and separator;
3. Main engine and auxiliary machinery jacket-water circulating pumps including piping systems, cooler and heater;
4. Main engine starting air system including compressor, air tank and starting air piping systems;
5. Main engine water cooling system including pump, cooler and piping systems.

C. Emergency generator

1. Starting of the generating sets;
2. Energy storing devices for starting of the generating sets;
3. Maintenance of emergency source of electrical power;
4. Testing of automatic starting arrangements, oil level and the condition of the starting arrangements for emergency generating sets.

III. Typical Deficiencies

A. Steering gear

1. Steering gear found out of order;
2. Mechanical parts of the steering gear found damaged;
3. The seal of rudder stock found leaking;
4. Communication device not provided between bridge and steering gear room;
5. Steering gear control system found out of work;
6. The low-level audible and visual alarm of steering gear hydraulic fluid reservoir found failed;
7. Oil-level gauge not found in steering gear hydraulic fluid storage tank;
8. Short circuit protection and an overload alarm for electrical circuits and motors of steering gear not provided in bridge or alarm found failed;
9. Power failure alarm of steering gear found out of work;
10. Phase loss alarm of steering gear out of work;
11. The rudder not capable of being put to a degree within a period of time in accordance with SOLAS;
12. Handrails and gratings or other nonslip surfaces not provided in steering gear compartments;
13. Loss of steering capability due to grounding;
14. Key crew members not familiar with the emergency steering procedures;
15. Key crew members not familiar with phase loss alarm test.

B. Main engine and auxiliary machinery

1. The connection of outlet of high pressure pump and the high pressure fuel pipe found leaking;
2. Main engine or generator not fitted with alarm for leakage from jacketed piping system or alarm found out of work;
3. External high-pressure fuel delivery lines between the high-pressure fuel pumps and fuel injectors not protected with a jacketed piping system;
4. Main engine not fitted with low lubricating oil pressure alarm or the alarm found out of order;
5. lubricating oil failure alarm found out of work;
6. Pressure of water cooling system insufficient due to water cooling pump damaged;
7. Water temperature increases due to failure of thermostatic valve of main engine cooling system or dirty or blockage of cooler;
8. Main engine cooling system high temperature alarm found out of order;
9. Main engine starting air tank low pressure alarm found out of work;
10. In multi-engine installations which are supplied from the same fuel source, means of isolating the fuel supply and spill piping to individual engines not provided (3 types of isolation, isolating valve shall be installed not less than 5 meters away from any engine; the operational place of isolating valve shall be jacketed; remote operational arrangements shall be provided);
11. Air compressor found out of work due to cooler leaking as result of air in cooling water;
12. Main engine starting air pressure found insufficient due to one air compressor out of work or not in good condition;
13. Seawater pipe rusted and damaged, blockage of sea chest filter;
14. Main engine fresh water pump shaft seal found serious leaking;
15. Temperature control valve of main engine fresh water cooling piping found out of order;
16. Main engine fresh water cooling jacket found ruptured, fresh water temperature sensor found out of work, fresh water cooler found dirty etc.;
17. High temperature due to insufficient lubricating oil in shaft intermediate bearing;
18. Emergency shutoff arrangements near the main engine found out of work;
19. Main engine emergency shutoff arrangements installed in the bridge found out of order;
20. Alarm for low lubricating oil pressure of main engine gear transmission found out of work;
21. Alarm for high lubricating oil temperature of main engine gear transmission found out of work (output greater than 1,470 kW);
22. Key crew members not familiar with test of main engine high pressure pipe leaking alarm;
23. Key crew members not familiar with procedure for main engine emergency operation.

C. Emergency generator

1. Emergency generator failed to start;
2. Emergency generator revolution counter/lubricating oil pressure gauge found out of work;

3. Emergency generator starting energy including accumulator voltage and air pressure insufficient;
4. The electrical powers of the emergency air compressor not provided by the emergency switchboard;
5. Test of emergency generator failed;
6. Emergency generator low lubricating oil alarm found out of work;
7. Emergency generator governor found out of order;
8. Emergency generator fails to maintain stable voltage and frequency;
9. Emergency generator failed to start automatically upon failure of the electrical supply from the main source of electrical power and shall be automatically connected to and restore power to the emergency switchboard within 45 s (this applies when no accumulator battery is provided);
10. Key crew members not familiar with procedure for emergency generator operation.